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## BUILDING ON FOREIGN EXPERTISE. MILITARY AND AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS AND THE EASTWARD EXPANSION OF SIXTEENTH- AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SWEDEN

### Abstract

In the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century, the Kingdom of Sweden was almost constantly engaged in armed conflicts with neighbouring kingdoms. Both offensive and defensive wars were characteristic of the Swedish foreign policy from 1550s to 1650s. The same period witnessed the emergence of the Swedish Empire because, due to these conflicts, Sweden was able to acquire new domains in the Baltic region and to expand its territories in both east and south. These geopolitical realities pushed all Vasa kings into multiple projects aiming to rationalise Sweden's army and its military strategy as well as to develop the acquired areas in various ways. Our article presents two development project examples of this emerging empire (1) Scottish officers (the Swedish Crown acknowledged the military expertise of Scottish troops as well as their officers and tried to harness this experience for Sweden), and (2) the planned modernisation of Ingria through German and Dutch colonisation and agricultural development. The article examines the needs and expertise expectations that the Swedish Crown directed towards these foreign groups. The emergence of Sweden as a European empire did not occur in a geopolitical vacuum. International contacts and the influx of European expertise into Sweden were important factors in the building of the Swedish dominion in the

Baltic region. By focusing on these foreign expert groups, one operating in the military world and the other in the agricultural sphere, this article illustrates the functions and roles that the Swedish Crown expected foreign experts to have on the eastern frontier of early modern Sweden.

**Keywords:** military expertise, Scottish officers, foreign expertise, agricultural expertise, Ingria, Sweden

## INTRODUCTION

In the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, the Kingdom of Sweden was almost constantly engaged in armed conflicts with neighbouring kingdoms. Both offensive and defensive wars were characteristic of the Swedish foreign policy from 1550s to 1650s.<sup>1</sup> The same period witnessed the emergence of the Swedish Empire because, due to these conflicts, Sweden acquired new domains in the Baltic region and expanded its territories in both the east and the south. These geopolitical realities pushed all Vasa kings into taking on multiple projects aiming to rationalise Sweden's army and its military strategy and develop the acquired areas in various ways. Our article presents two development project examples of this emerging empire: (1) the presence of Scottish officers in the Swedish service in the second half of the sixteenth century (the Swedish Crown acknowledged the military expertise of the Scottish troops as well as their officers and tried to harness this experience for Sweden), and (2) the planned modernisation of Ingria through German and Dutch colonisation and agricultural development in the first half of the seventeenth century. These groups were well integrated and influential in other spheres of Swedish society but they were notably prominent in the fields studied in this article.<sup>2</sup> This article focuses on the needs and expectations

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<sup>1</sup> Alexia Grosjean, 'Scots and the Swedish State: diplomacy, military service and ennoblement 1601–1660', unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Aberdeen, 1998), pp. 35–37.

<sup>2</sup> Germans and, to a lesser extent, the Dutch were found serving in Swedish military apparatus since the sixteenth century, while many Scots rose high in the Swedish society at the same time; see Alexia Grosjean, *An Unofficial Alliance, Scotland and Sweden 1569–1654* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 18, 19; Martin Neuding Skoog, 'Militära entreprenörer I 1500-talets Sverige', *Historisk Tidskrift*, 137, no. 4 (2017), 90, 91.

of expertise that the Swedish Crown directed towards these foreign groups. The emergence of Sweden as a European empire did not occur in a geopolitical vacuum. International contacts and the influx of European expertise into Sweden were essential factors in building the Swedish dominion in the Baltic region. By focusing on these foreign expert groups – one operating in the military world and the other in the agricultural sphere – this article illustrates the functions and roles that the Swedish Crown expected foreign experts to have on the eastern frontier of early modern Sweden.

The article draws on the theoretical model of early modern experts developed by Eric H. Ash. As Ash underscores, the term expert is an anachronism in the early modern context.<sup>3</sup> In agreement with Ash, we believe that when carefully operationalised, the concept can encapsulate and help explain the phenomenon studied in this article: the interrelation between the emerging early modern state and the experts constructing and maintaining their expertise.

Ash's theoretical model consists of the following five criteria: An early modern expert (1) possessed specific practical and productive knowledge in a particular field, and (2) this knowledge was experience-based. Furthermore, it included (3) abstraction from practice to theory, which meant that (4) it was impossible to consider just any typical practitioner of a specific trade to be an expert. Finally, (5) expertise had to be legitimised by the social and political context<sup>4</sup> – in our case, the emerging early modern empire of Sweden itself.

In general terms, on the eastern frontier of Sweden, the Scottish officers and the Dutch agricultural developers encountered a scene that allowed them to practice their trade and gain legitimacy to establish and develop their role as experts. On the other hand, the Swedish Crown depended on the specific practical and theoretical knowledge possessed by these experts for maintaining and stabilising the areas that were annexed during the country's eastward expansion. In this respect, the article also contributes to the general theme of this special issue – the

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<sup>3</sup> Eric H. Ash, 'Introduction: Expertise and the Early Modern State', *Osiris*, 25, no. 1 (2010), 1–24.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5–10.

foreign experts discussed in this article fall under the category of the various agents, which the combination of new diplomatic history and study of Sweden as an empire aims to examine. Sweden needed the experts to provide know-how crucial to maintaining and expanding the empire. The experts needed a space and a context in which to manifest and legitimise their expertise, and portray themselves as men of both credibility and skill.

Previous research (Thomas Alfred Fischer, James Dow, Alexia Grosjean, and Steve Murdoch) has established and underlined the strong political, military and economic influences that Scots brought into the Kingdom of Sweden in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The military expertise of these troops was one channel through which the Scots affected the development of the Swedish military apparatus. The expertise of foreign soldiers was a logical and proven way for the Kingdom of Sweden (1) to strengthen its armies, and (2) to modernise and further develop its armed forces and ways of waging war. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, the kings of Sweden actively enlisted Scottish military enterprisers to recruit infantry and cavalry for their service. The use of these individuals was not limited only to their services for the kingdom as recruiters and captains of Scottish troops. The Swedish kings widely recognised the military and political expertise of Scottish officers. From the mid- to the late sixteenth century, Scottish officers were appointed as captains of native Swedish units and governors of Swedish cities and forts in the war zones. Some were also invited to the court to be courtiers and diplomats.<sup>5</sup>

Concerning agricultural expertise, previous research (e.g., Kepsu, Kujala, Hallenberg) points out that the Swedish authorities (mainly King Gustavus Adolphus and his governor in Livonia [including Ingria], Johan Skytte) aimed to colonise Ingria with Dutch and German settlers, who were capable of turning this area into a highly productive agricultural region. When this plan, already in action, fell through due to economic realities, the area was colonised by Finnish settlers,

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<sup>5</sup> Alexia Grosjean, 'A century of Scottish Governorship in the Swedish Empire 1574–1700', in *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers c. 1600–1800: A Study of Scotland and Empires*, ed. by Andrew Mackillop, Steve Murdoch (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 15, 23.

following a *laissez-faire* policy by the Crown.<sup>6</sup> The prioritised *experts* were Dutch and German settlers and the landlords governing them. In contrast, the Crown saw the Finnish settlers who later moved to the area as common practitioners of agriculture.

### SCOTTISH MILITARY EXPERTISE IN SWEDEN

When considering the needs and expectations of expertise that the Swedish Crown projected towards Scottish officers, it is essential to discuss how the terms ‘professional soldier’ and ‘expert’ can be applied to these men. This study aims to shed light on the kind of expertise expected from these individuals; thus, it is first necessary to explain which of these men could be considered professional soldiers and why. In the early modern period, Scotland featured a strong culture of personal honour and blood feuds turned into private wars, which encouraged nobles to have large numbers of armed retainers in their service. This, together with the feudal system of families bound by strict social hierarchies, meant that noble houses could quickly levy hundreds or even thousands of men to their private wars. The Scottish government also expected that all males of fighting age in the realm owned at least some weapons and were proficient with them.<sup>7</sup> These factors resulted in a substantial number of soldiers in Scotland, creating a large pool of potential recruited soldiers to serve in other European armies. These recruited troops and their officers earned a salary for their service.

Fighting for a living makes one a professional soldier, but not necessarily an expert in the context of Ash’s model. When examining the Scottish troops’ recruiters, captains, or colonels in the Swedish military

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<sup>6</sup> Mats Hallenberg, *Statsmakt till salu. Arrendesystemet och privatiseringen av skatteuppbörden i det svenska riket 1618–1635* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2008), pp. 63, 72, 103, 116; Antti Kujala, ‘Viipurin Karjala, Käkisalmen lääni ja Inkerinmaa Ruotsin suurvaltakaudesta 1617–1710’, in *Suomenlahdelta Laatokalle. Viipurin läänin historia III*, ed. by Kimmo Katajala, Antti Kujala, and Anssi Mäkinen (Lappeenranta: Karjalan Kirjapaino, 2010), pp. 268–69; Kasper Kepsu, *Den besvärliga provinsen: reduktion, skattearrendering och bondeoroligheter i det svenska Ingermanland under slutet av 1600-talet* (Helsinki: Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten, 2014), pp. 51–52, 108–09.

<sup>7</sup> Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years’ War, 1618–1648* (Boca Raton: Routledge 2014), pp. 27–40.

apparatus, the line between professional soldier and expert becomes blurred. Many of the Scottish recruiters in Swedish service came from Scottish noble families, while two were ennobled in Sweden in the second half of the sixteenth century.<sup>8</sup> Others were given either land grants or offices by Sweden, which bound them to the kingdom while they were still, at least on paper, commanders of their standards.<sup>9</sup> These men could hardly be regarded only as professional soldiers. Considering their status as nobles, their standing within the society and recognition from their peers and the Swedish Crown made them experts, following Ash's model.

The *Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern Europe* database on Scottish officers serving in sixteenth-century Sweden (compiled by Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean) provides much information about the careers of the individuals who recruited and led Scottish or, in some cases, Swedish troops. The forms of expertise that the Swedish Crown expected and tried to harness from these officers were (1) the ability to work effectively in recruitment operations, (2) the ability to lead men and operate in the theatres of war, as well as (3) the ability to forge and upkeep loyal veteran standards over multiple years. All these skills and aspects were expected from all military enterprisers by all governments that hired them in early modern Europe. Changing warfare and ever longer-lasting campaigns meant that governments needed professional soldiers and professional military leaders capable of being successful in theatres of war and whom they could use instead of, or in addition to, native conscript troops. This enabled waging long and large campaigns of war (especially overseas) without draining the realm of its population and causing potential rebellions.<sup>10</sup> Hence, by concentrating on a specific group within the

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<sup>8</sup> Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern Europe database (hereafter cited as SSNE), Sir Andrew Keith, SSNE 1534, and John (Hans) Stuart, Lord of Hedenlunda, SSNE 1645.

<sup>9</sup> Such as captain Henry Leyell (SSNE 182), and captain William Ruthven (SSNE 1721 & 4177). Standard was a unit of troops numbering typically 500 infantry or 300 cavalry. See Joose Olavi Hannula, *Sotataidon historia II – Taktiikan ja Strategian pääpiirteet* (Otava, 1931), pp. 196, 197; and Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1964), p. 39.

<sup>10</sup> Michael Roberts, 'The Military Revolution, 1560–1660', in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*,

cluster of foreign officers in Swedish service – the *Scottish* officers – it is possible to observe not only how the Swedish Crown manifested its expectations of expertise towards the Scots, specifically, but also how the Crown could evaluate that expected expertise.

## RECRUITERS

The sixteenth-century recruiters of soldiers were military enterprisers who, for a lump sum of money or by extending credit, recruited a certain number of troops, usually numbering tens or hundreds (and, occasionally, even thousands) of men. Whether or not the recruiter was paid upfront, the recruiting princes faced multiple risks when committing to contract a recruiter. The recruitment could drag on, and the soldiers might muster late or, in the worst-case scenario, not at all. The number of recruited men could be lower than the number initially agreed upon with the contractor – or higher, as was the case with the recruitment of Scottish troops to Sweden by Sir Archibald Ruthven in 1573.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, if money was advanced to the recruiter, there was also a risk that the recruiter could fail to provide troops or to return the advanced money.<sup>12</sup>

Consequently, it made sense that the early modern princes would want to ensure, as much as possible, that the recruiters with whom they made recruitment deals were both capable recruiters as well as trustworthy partners. Ash's model serves a double purpose when

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ed. by Clifford J. Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 13, 14; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution – Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge [England]–New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 228–31; Magnus Linnarsson, 'Unfaithful and expensive – but absolutely necessary: perceptions of mercenaries in Swedish war policy, 1621–1636', *Revue d'histoire nordique*, 18 (2014), 68, 69.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas Alfred Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden: Being a Contribution towards the History of the Scots Abroad* (Edinburgh: Otto Schulze & CO 1907), p. 48.

<sup>12</sup> Jaakko Björklund and Sebastian Schiavone, *Networks of Recruitment: Fiscal-Military Operations to Contract Foreign Soldiers for Sweden 1605–1610* (forthcoming, 2021). On the international recruiting process and the financing of it, see also 'Administering Empire. Business diplomacy in early modern Sweden' by Katja Tikka, Jaakko Björklund, and Kaarle Wirta in this volume.

observing the skills and expertise that the Swedish Crown expected from the Scottish officers who recruited soldiers for them. First, it would be an exaggeration to argue that all would-be Scottish recruiters that the Swedish Crown had deemed capable and trustworthy enough to contract for recruitment purposes were experts, *per se*. Instead, by applying Ash's model to the Crown's expectations, we learn what expertise the Crown expected the contractors to possess (capable of successfully operating as recruiters). We also learn what kind of expertise and experts the Crown strove to harvest into its cluster of trusted contractors from the midst of successful recruiters.

In the sixteenth century, the Swedish Crown contracted Scottish military enterprisers twice to recruit a levy that numbered two thousand men – a notably high number in the context of sixteenth-century Sweden. Both of these recruitment contracts failed. The first one, a deal made between Michael Lermont, Egon Dod and Gustav Vasa, was not realised,<sup>13</sup> while the second one, made between Sir Archibald Ruthven and King John III, was famously catastrophic because Ruthven brought with him far more men than originally agreed upon. Thus, the king struggled to pay for all the soldiers, and the campaign in which these Scots took part ended in the almost total annihilation of the Scottish troops and imprisonment of Ruthven as a traitor.<sup>14</sup> If both of these recruitment attempts were unsuccessful, what had made the Swedish Crown trust these individuals with such a significant task?

According to Ash's model, a person who (1) was legitimised by a social circle and (2) possessed both practical and theoretical knowledge in their field that was also experience-based could be considered an expert. Both Lermont and Dod were part of the Scottish gentry and came from the Scottish court. Ruthven, too, came from an influential noble family with members in high places – Ruthven's brother, William, was the Lord Treasurer of Scotland, and, together with Scotland's regent, he recommended his brother's services to the Swedish

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<sup>13</sup> *Handlingar rörande Sveriges historia, Första serien: Konung Gustaf den Förstes regsitatur*, part IX (Stockholm, 1896), pp. 148, 149; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp. 14, 15.

<sup>14</sup> See James Dow, 'Ruthven's army in Sweden and Estonia', *Historiskt arkiv*, no. 13 (1965).



Crown.<sup>15</sup> Being, or being portrayed of being, of high social standing connects to Ash's argument that early modern experts needed to be legitimised by society. Dod and Lermont, as well as Ruthven, were all members of the high nobility and were, therefore, regarded by the Swedish Crown as respectable and trustworthy men. Likewise, recommendations from the Scottish court in favour of Ruthven further advanced the idea that Ruthven was a man capable of performing the task.

In the eyes of the Swedish Crown, high societal status or recommendation from someone of high status implied that the would-be recruiter was a trustworthy individual and indicated that he had both social and economic capacity to accomplish a recruitment successfully. Social capacity, in this context, meant that the would-be recruiter had a wide network to help find enough potential recruits and, if needed, have the support of the local authority. Economic capacity meant that the would-be recruiter had sufficient economic resources to carry out the recruitment to the point where the Crown would begin paying wages to the troops.<sup>16</sup>

In the case of Ruthven, Ash's second condition was also realised. In early modern Europe, nobles were still considered the primary warrior class with the right to carry arms and wage war.<sup>17</sup> In addition to this, Ruthven had also participated in the Marian civil war of 1568–1573<sup>18</sup> and, consequently, could claim that he (and possibly the men he would bring with him to Sweden) had real field experience in addition to the knowledge he was already assumed to possess, given his warrior-class background.

Another way in which the Swedish Crown could harness the expertise needed for successful recruitment was to obtain potential recruiters from the pool of Scottish captains who were already in its service.

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<sup>15</sup> James Miller, *Swords for Hire – The Scottish Mercenary* (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2007), pp. 33, 34; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp. 17, 18. See also SSNE 5514: Archibald Ruthven.

<sup>16</sup> Björklund, Schiavone, *Networks of Recruitment*.

<sup>17</sup> David J.B. Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars". The Employment of the English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1526–1600', PhD dissertation (Department of War Studies, Kings College, University of London, 2002), pp. 81–85.

<sup>18</sup> Miller, *Swords for Hire*, p. 35.

This custom became increasingly common after the Northern Seven Years' War (1563–1570). William Cahun, a member of the Colquhoun family,<sup>19</sup> first appeared in the records of the Swedish armed forces in 1565. That record features 154 '*skotzke ryttere*'<sup>20</sup> that probably formed a standard led by Cahun, as that was the year he started his service in Sweden as a captain of a Scottish cavalry standard.<sup>21</sup> Cahun was not a member of the high aristocracy and was, possibly, entirely unknown to King Eric XIV of Sweden before applying to his service. Thus, by contracting only a relatively small number of recruits from Cahun, the Swedish king attempted both to minimise the risk of failure while offering Cahun the chance to prove his worth by recruiting the number of men that the king (and maybe Cahun himself) thought Cahun capable of handling. Four years later, in 1569, Cahun's Scottish cavalry standard numbered 635 men,<sup>22</sup> which meant that he had not only served the kingdom and led his standard successfully but also that he had recruited more men under his command and was still in the Swedish service after the war had ended. Having served successfully and having proved his ability by completing the initial recruitment, the Swedish Crown could contract Cahun for subsequent recruitments with more trust. King John III had an additional reason to trust Cahun because, in his conflict with King Eric XIV, which led to the downfall of Eric and to John's ascension to the throne, Cahun quickly took King John III's side.<sup>23</sup>

Of the men serving under the Cahun standard,<sup>24</sup> three advanced to become recruiters of Scottish troops and captains of their own Scottish cavalry standards in Sweden. William Moncrieff led a cavalry standard in 1570 and was commissioned to recruit another

<sup>19</sup> SSNE 6046: William Cahun.

<sup>20</sup> Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Strödda Militiehandlingar före 1631, Kommissariats-m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Register opå Konunge Mattz krigzfolk pro anno 65.

<sup>21</sup> SSNE 6046: William Cahun

<sup>22</sup> Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Strödda Militiehandlingar före 1631, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Pontus De la Gardies, Hans Kyles, Måns Erikssons, Nils Larssons och Henrik Matsons räkenskap för krigsfolkets avlöning (2 ex.), (fuktskadade) 1569.

<sup>23</sup> SSNE 6046: William Cahun.

<sup>24</sup> See Swedish Military Archives, Stockholm (hereafter cited as SMA), Militieräkningar. Lönelängd över William Kohuns fana 1569.

in 1573.<sup>25</sup> Henry Leyell led a Scottish cavalry standard from at least 1582 onward and was commissioned to recruit another in 1591.<sup>26</sup> William Ruthven was first appointed as an officer under the Leyell standard until 1591, when he was commissioned to recruit a standard of his own.<sup>27</sup> When these men were commissioned to recruit soldiers, they had already served successfully in Sweden for years, under the command of another Scottish captain. All of them had most likely seen field action during the Northern Seven Years' War.

It is clear that the Swedish service record of these men had assured the Swedish Crown of their ability to recruit troops from Scotland and lead them in Sweden. The Crown also appears to have scaled its recruitment contracts to match these veteran recruiters' economic and social capabilities. Both Henry Leyell and William Ruthven were, without a doubt, successful recruiters and captains: Leyell served in Sweden until 1599 when he fell out with duke Charles, and William Ruthven attempted his last recruitment as late as 1608.<sup>28</sup> However, neither was contracted to recruit more soldiers than needed for one standard at any point because the Crown realised that neither Leyell nor Ruthven had the necessary resources to recruit thousands of men, as Sir Archibald (the colonel of Scots mentioned above recruited to Sweden in 1573) did. Nevertheless, both the first and second conditions of Ash's model can be applied to these men. The merits of Cahun, Moncrieff, Leyell and Ruthven were legitimised both by their peers, as all of them had service history under Cahun's standard, and by the Crown, which tended to contract would-be recruiters among the individuals already in its service rather than among completely unknown military contractors.

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<sup>25</sup> SMA, Militieräkningar, Munkpränt, Anders Månssons och Mats Bengtssons räkenskaper rörande avloning för utländska värvade ryttare, 1569–1573; Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Riksregistraturet, Letter from King John III to William Moncrieff & David Corr, 1 June 1573.

<sup>26</sup> SSNE 182: Henry Leyell; Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Riksregistraturet, Letter from King John III to captain Henry Leyell, 4 Sep. 1578.

<sup>27</sup> SMA, Militieräkningar, Munkpränt, Letter from King John III to captain William Ruthven, 23 July 1591; 1591 räkenskaper vol. 12: William Redwens räkenskaper för en fana skottska ryttare 1591–1593, Anders Månssons och Mats Bengtssons räkenskaper rörande avloning för utländska värvade ryttare. 1569–1573.

<sup>28</sup> SSNE 182: Henry Leyell; SSNE 1721 & 4177: William Ruthven.

## PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS

In the early modern business of war, it was customary for the recruiting captains or colonels also to lead the soldiers they recruited in the war arena. Scottish recruiters were no exception; in the sixteenth century, all Scottish recruiters contracted to recruit troops for Sweden also personally led their troops. Depending on the size of the recruited troop, the recruiter was appointed either as captain of a standard or a regiment colonel.<sup>29</sup> The recruiters needed to possess relevant knowledge and expertise, not only about the recruitment process but also about early modern warfare itself. Notably, the same attributes that made the Swedish Crown regard would-be recruiters as successful in recruitment operations also made these men appear to have the potential to be successful captains and colonels in the eyes of the Swedish Crown. This highlights the multilayered role of the military enterpriser and an officer of foreign troops both as a professional recruiter and a professional soldier. Noble status and aristocratic recommendation were proof that these individuals had the capacity to succeed in warfare.

Military campaigns often did not play out as planned. And, it is precisely these failures that lay bare both the trust and the high expectations that the Crown had projected towards the expert. One such instance is the aftermath of the Swedish campaign in Livonia from 1573 to 1574 which ended in the failure to capture the fortress of Wesenberg and in the dissolution of a notable portion of the Swedish army because its German soldiers massacred its Scottish troops in a fit of leaderless animosity. King John III accused Sir Archibald Ruthven of failing to lead his men properly.<sup>30</sup> While it is disputable to what extent the failure of the campaign was Sir Archibald's fault, King John's disappointment and accusations, as well as the fact that 10 of the total 45 standards of the Swedish army consisted of Scots under the command of Sir Archibald,<sup>31</sup> highlight both the trust and the high expectations that the Crown had projected towards the Scottish colonel and the high level

<sup>29</sup> Redlich, *German Military Enterpriser*, vol. 1, pp. 39, 40.

<sup>30</sup> See Dow, 'Ruthven's army'.

<sup>31</sup> Werner Tawaststjerna, *Pohjoismaiden Viisikolmattavuotinen Sota – Vuosien 1570 ja 1590 välinen aika* ([Helsinki:] Suom. Kirj. Seuran Kirjapaino, 1918–20[1929]), pp. 97, 98.

of military capacity that King John believed Sir Archibald to possess in light of his noble status as well as the recommendations given by the Scottish government.

On the other hand, the Swedish Crown wanted to retain those individuals who had, through prior experience in the Swedish service, proven their worth as trustworthy military leaders and recruiters. When, in 1570, King John III disbanded his foreign troops, his order specifically mentioned that, although he was disbanding the troops, those officers wishing to stay in the Swedish service could do so.<sup>32</sup> The Scottish officers who had served the Swedish Crown were worth keeping in the Swedish cluster of foreign military officers. Not only had these individuals proven that they were capable of recruiting completely new standards of troops and personally leading them, as well as of successfully recruiting new soldiers to their already existing standards, but they had also procured new recruiters and other military specialists for the Swedish institution of war.

#### LEADERS OF VETERAN STANDARDS

The Scottish-Swedish network served a dual purpose concerning Scottish standards in Swedish service. Firstly, it enabled the Swedish Crown to have much-wanted veteran units under trusted and capable captains in its cluster. When needed, the Crown could disband the troops but keep the officers in its service, knowing that these officers could – through their networks – recruit Scottish troops again when needed. Alternatively, the Crown could diminish a standard to its bare minimum, keeping the officers and the ‘core’ of the troops in its service, then later again bolster the ranks of the standard on the cusp of a new campaign.<sup>33</sup> An excellent example of this strategy is Henry Leyell’s Scottish cavalry standard. During the truce year between Sweden and Russia, in 1584, payrolls show that 55 men were paid a salary. When the hostilities between the

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<sup>32</sup> Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Riksregistraturet, Letter from King John III to Andrew Keith, 21 Dec. 1570.

<sup>33</sup> Keeping desired military enterprisers in service and ready to take a contract when needed in times of peace with a diminished pay was a normal procedure amongst early modern princes. See *Dienstgeld* in Redlich, *German Military Enterpriser*, vol. 1, p. 56.

two kingdoms were renewed in 1590, Leyell's standard payroll shows payments made to 313 soldiers and, a year later, to 590 soldiers.<sup>34</sup> Secondly, Scottish standards that served long-term also worked as a springboard for capable officers. Many officers from Scottish standards obtained recruiter status and became leaders of their own standards; they also obtained positions as commanders of fortresses and castles. For example, Hans Burdt, who hailed from Henry Leyell's standard, commanded Jamanborg castle in 1590,<sup>35</sup> and Thomas Abernethy was the governor of Viborg in 1591.<sup>36</sup> Both places were either in or near the war zone of the then raging 25-year Russo-Swedish war.

It would be far-fetched to assume that the Swedish Crown specifically expected Scottish officers to possess expertise in the fields of city governance or fortress command. Instead, in addition to being capable recruiters and military leaders, the Crown expected the Scottish officers to loyally serve for long periods and use their social networks and capabilities to forge veteran standards. These standards would serve Sweden for several years, even decades, by alternately diminishing and bolstering the ranks of their standard following the needs of the Crown. Since the same standard was kept in service for years with the same officers, the Crown had time to familiarise itself with the persons. This enabled the Swedish Crown to garner whatever military expertise was found among these individuals and put it to use in the Swedish institution of war by commissioning new recruitments from them or appointing them into suitable military positions.

Thus, we can summarise the skills and attributes that the Swedish Crown expected from the Scottish officers as follows: possession of economic and social resources that were sufficient for successfully accomplishing recruitment contracts, social status that proved the would-be recruiters' trustworthiness, and field experience that proved their ability to lead soldiers. It has to be noted that, even if the officers possessed all these attributes at a high level, this did not mean that the Crown considered them to be experts and capable of harnessing their

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<sup>34</sup> SMA, Militieräkningar, 1582 räkenskaper, vol. 3: Hendrich Leils räkenskaper rörande avlöning för en fana skottska ryttare, 1582–1594.

<sup>35</sup> SSNE 1683: Hans Burdt.

<sup>36</sup> SSNE: 1744: Thomas Abernethy.

expected expertise. Dod, Lermont, and Sir Archibald Ruthven did not accomplish successful recruitments nor was their service long-lasting in Sweden. However, their capacity to recruit soldiers was considerably higher than that of, for example, William Cahun and the men under his standard. Nevertheless, it was Henry Leyell and William Ruthven – serving in Sweden from the late 1560s to the 1590s or 1600s, respectively, even though they operated at a lower expertise capacity level – whose expertise the Swedish Crown was able to harness and make the most use of, primarily thanks to their trustful relationship with the Swedish Crown, which had been built over decades of service in Sweden.

#### CENTRAL EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS IN SWEDISH INGRIA

The second case that this article explores is Sweden's expertise expectations in agricultural colonisation. This case centres around the region known as Swedish Ingria, annexed by Sweden in 1617, and ceded to Russia in 1721. The case study at hand mainly concerns two particular events that occurred in the early and mid-seventeenth century. The first one is the writing of the paragraph on foreign peasants and landowners in the *Ingermanländska kapitulationen*. This 1622 document details the rights and restrictions of landowners in the area. The second event is the renting of a part of Ingria to landowners led by the Dutchman Abraham Sixt in the 1630s. These events expose what expectations the Swedish administration had for the German and Dutch landowners and peasants that they sought to recruit to render Ingrian agriculture more profitable.

The similarities with the case of the Scottish officers are apparent: just as the Swedish Crown had hired Scottish captains and colonels in order to make use of their contacts and expertise to gather troops for Sweden, the Crown also entrusted members of the German and Dutch nobility, like Sixt, with hiring Dutch and German settlers in order to turn the Ingria region into a productive agricultural province.

FOREIGN EXPERTS IN INGRIA: GENERAL PRAXIS  
OR A SPECIAL SOLUTION?

Historian Mats Hallenberg treats the Swedish initiative to promote Central European land ownership in Ingria in the context of the general impulse of King Gustavus Adolphus' government to rent Swedish areas out to private persons, often foreigners, to ensure an efficient organisation of business, administration or taxation. Gothenburg is a classic example, where the king instructed the Dutch mayors Jakob van Dijk and Abraham Cabiljau to bring Dutch merchants to the city to make its trade flourish.<sup>37</sup> In addition, Hallenberg's example of the German textile manufacturer Hans Leffler, whom the Crown financially supported to recruit all of his workforce from Germany, points out how Sweden sought to import foreign know-how. Last but not least, the thoroughly researched field of Wallonian experts who 'revolutionised' the manufacturing of iron in Sweden is worth mentioning.<sup>38</sup>

On the other hand, Antti Kujala interprets the renting out of Ingria to Sixt as a strategic move from the Swedish Crown. Kujala considers the Governor-General of Swedish Livonia, Ingria and Karelia, Johan Skytte (in office from 1629 to 1634), to be a scrupulous man of power. According to Kujala, in renting out the area, Skytte used Sixt for his own and the government's purposes. By luring Sixt into signing a contract with promises of grain supply that were impossible to fulfil, the Crown could access Sixt's capital in a context in which the war-waging kingdom desperately needed grain and capital. As Kujala points out, Skytte later admitted that the contract with Sixt was unfair and difficult for the latter to fulfil.<sup>39</sup>

Both Hallenberg's and Kujala's interpretations are wholly plausible. When viewed from the perspective of early modern experts, the third line of interpretation becomes apparent, highlighting the role of foreign

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<sup>37</sup> On Gothenburg and the role of Dutchmen in the establishment of the town, see also Tikka, Björklund, and Wirta, 'Administering Empire', in this volume.

<sup>38</sup> Hallenberg, *Statsmakt till salu*, pp. 63, 72, 103, 116; Leos Müller, 'The Dutch entrepreneurial networks and Sweden in the Age of Greatness', in *Trade, diplomacy and cultural exchange. Continuity and change in the North Sea area and the Baltic c. 1350–1750*, ed. by Hanno Brand (Hilversum: Verloren, 2005), pp. 58–74.

<sup>39</sup> Kujala, 'Viipurin Karjala', pp. 268–269; See also Carl Öhlander, *Bidrag till kännedom om Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1898), p. 41–43.



expertise that both Sixt, specifically, and the Dutch and German landlords and farmers, generally, were expected to bring with them. This article investigates this third line of interpretation by combining the theoretical framework of Ash with the views that the king and his governor-general held about foreign expertise in the agricultural development of Ingria.

#### INGRIA IN-BETWEEN THE KINGDOM AND THE EMPIRE?

Swedish Ingria was a piece of land that Sweden annexed, together with Ingria's 'sister province' to the north, Kexholm, under the Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617, following the Ingrian War against Russia. The annexation of Ingria was part of the eastward expansion that the Swedish Crown undertook during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.

Historians debate the status of Ingria within the Swedish administration. At the roots of this debate lies the question of whether Ingria was, like various Finnish provinces, an integrated part of the kingdom or, whether it was, in analogy with the neighbouring Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia, a more loosely connected part of the realm. Nils Erik Villstrand and Kasper Kepsu have concluded that it was an in-between case. In terms of administration, the area and its two cities (Narva and Nyen) were more closely connected to Sweden than the neighbouring dominions of Estonia and Livonia. Nevertheless, the cities did not have the right to send their burghers to the Swedish Diet. The idea of colonising the area with Dutch and German settlers also points toward policies that were more typical of overseas dominions within the realm than toward the annexation of Ingria to the kingdom itself.

Estonia and Livonia continued, after the annexation, to be ruled by the local German-speaking elites in a feudal fashion. In contrast, the various provinces in modern-day Finland were, since the Middle Ages, closely connected to the administration of Sweden, forming part of the kingdom itself. In Ingria, local elites continued to have certain powers over the region, but the area was connected to Swedish jurisdiction more firmly than Estonia and Livonia ever were.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Kepsu, *Den besvärliga provinsen*, pp. 57–63; Nils Erik Villstrand, *Sveriges historia 1600–1721* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2011), p. 309.

SWEDISH CONTROL THROUGH MISSION  
AND COLONISATION

A demographic problem that the Swedish administration faced in Ingria was that many of the peasants in the area were of the Christian Eastern Orthodox denomination. To put it in modern terms, this Orthodox population was not uniform in terms of language and ethnicity. Apart from Russian-speaking peasants, many Orthodox Ingrians had either Votic or Izhorian as their first language. These languages are Balto-Finnic, and the Swedish Crown treated the Votes and Izhorians differently from Russian speakers. The Russian speakers were largely left alone to avoid open conflict with the rulers in Moscow. In the case of the Votes and Izhorians, however, the Swedish administration fabricated a narrative that these Finnic-speaking peasants were, in fact, Finns who had already once been converted to Lutheranism but were then reconverted to the Orthodox denomination by Russians. Thus, it was only right that Lutheran Sweden claimed them as their own and converted them back to their original Lutheran denomination. The only problem was that few Votes or Izhorians were keen on becoming Lutheran, and many of these peasants fled to the Russian side of the border together with their Russian-speaking Orthodox peers instead of converting. Ideally, the field now lay open for importing landlords and peasants from Germany and the Netherlands. Not only were these peasants Protestant (although not necessarily Lutheran, especially in the case of the Dutch), but they were also used to the more efficient methods of agriculture practised in Central Europe, which the Crown hoped would lead to generous harvests in Ingria.<sup>41</sup>

In the 1622 *Ingermanländska kapitulationen*, which sets out the administrative rules in the newly annexed dominion, King Gustavus Adolphus' administration launched the idea of renting out Ingria to German individuals who could develop the province into a flourishing agricultural area. This initiative can be viewed within the general context of making the most of the economic opportunities in the peripheral areas within the realm. For instance, in what is now northern Sweden and Finland, the Crown intensified its policies starting in the early

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<sup>41</sup> Kujala, 'Viipurin Karjala', p. 251.

seventeenth century. The royal administration established mines and promoted agricultural colonisation but also favoured Sámi reindeer herding because it was viewed as an economically productive livelihood in the barren areas unsuitable for agriculture.<sup>42</sup> Ingria had no known mineral deposits that could be exploited through mines. However, the cities of Narva and Nyen that Sweden established in the area had promising prospects as centres for controlling trade from Russia to Eastern Europe. The Swedish Crown was not late in improving the conditions of merchants to develop trade in these trading towns. Apart from trade, an existing livelihood that the Crown viewed as having the potential for development in the Ingria region was agriculture.<sup>43</sup>

The *Ingermanländska kapitulationen* codifies the idea of renting out the area controlled by the Crown in the form of donations to foreign landlords who could then populate their donated lands with peasants from their native lands. However, it was not only the newly hired foreign landlords who were to import the labour force. The *Ingermanländska kapitulationen* also stipulates that both Swedish and Finnish landlords in the area would be ordered to attract German peasants to work their fields. The document explicitly states that the existing or prospective landlords should not attract peasants from 'Sweden, Finland, Estonia or Russia, or Ingria' but 'exclusively from Germany'. This is highly interesting from the point of view of the notion of expertise, as developed by Ash. Following Ash's model, the *Ingermanländska kapitulationen* sees as experts of agriculture not only the foreign landlords but also the foreign peasants who were to be hired to work the soil of Ingria. No ordinary Russian, Ingrian, Estonian, Finnish or Swedish practitioners of agriculture would do – expertise was needed and sought. For this reason, the ideal was to bring in peasants from Central Europe to increase the productivity and quality of agriculture in this newly annexed eastern corner of the Swedish realm. However, the plans fell through because the soils of Ingria were much poorer than what the farmers

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<sup>42</sup> Daniel Lindmark, 'Diaspora, integration, and cantonization. Swedish colonial education from a theoretical, comparative, and concluding perspective', in *Education and colonialism. Swedish schooling projects in colonial areas 1638–1878*, ed. by Daniel Lindmark (Umeå: Umeå University, 2000), pp. 15–40.

<sup>43</sup> Kepsu, *Den besvärliga provinsen*, p. 67.

and their landlords were used to, and the majority of the Germans left the area after only a few futile attempts at harvesting. In either case, concerning the expectations of the Swedish Crown, it is clear that the principal motive behind the formulation used in the *Ingermanländska kapitulationen* was to utilise foreign expertise to compensate for lack of competence or expertise in the Swedish Empire.<sup>44</sup>

Another initiative for bringing know-how to the arable lands of Ingria took place in the 1630s. On the recommendation of Governor Johan Skytte, King Gustavus Adolphus rented out the entire region of Ingria to the Dutchman Abraham Sixt von Sandelijn. Sixt was promoted to a Baron (*friherre*). Like the one outlined in the *Ingermanländska kapitulationen*, this plan fell through because Sixt could not live up to the unrealistic requirements of the contract. As interpreted by Antti Kujala, the Swedish Crown was aware of the difficulties facing anyone establishing large-scale agriculture in the area. The Crown was in desperate need of grain and cash, and, for this reason, it rented out the area despite the terms being unrealistic. As the focus of this article is on Swedish expertise expectations, it is less relevant to explore what the ultimate fate of Sixt's endeavours was than to look at what the Crown thought it would gain from renting the area to him, apart from the possible opportunistic cashing in of crops and capital. The Crown's motive for this transaction was, as in the *Ingermanländska kapitulationen* a decade before, to turn the area into a productive agricultural area. Based on Swedish documents, Kujala's treatment of the subject is matched by a description of the transaction found at the Amsterdam City Archives. As this document makes clear, Sixt did indeed promise the king that he would use the Dutch know-how and import Dutch and German peasants to meet the Crown's expectations.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Extraktbok Ingermanland 1622–1694, Livländska donationskontoret D Ic:4; Kepsu, *Den besvärliga provinsen*, pp. 108–09.

<sup>45</sup> Notarieel Archief, Stadsarchief Amsterdam, 670, fols 12–14, 1 June 1635 (index); Kujala, 'Viipurin Karjala', pp. 268–69.

## AGRICULTURAL EXPERTISE AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE PEASANT IMMIGRATION: REVISITING THE MODEL FOR EARLY MODERN EXPERTISE

After the plans to import Dutch and German settlers fell through and Skytte's tenure as governor-general of the area ended, there were no more active initiatives to improve the state of agriculture in the area by importing foreign landowners and peasants. Instead, Ingria was gradually populated by Finnish-speaking peasants following a *laissez-faire* policy by the Crown. This development emanated from a population growth in Finland that led to agricultural expansion to the north, east and, in the case of Ingria, also to the south of the core agricultural areas of Sweden and Finland. This *laissez-faire* immigration policy eventually led to an important demographic shift in the area. In many cases, the peasants who spoke Finnish dialects supplanted the Izhorian- and Votic-speaking Orthodox Ingrian population, leading to the emergence of a new ethnic group, the Ingrian Finns, comprising of the descendants of the Finnish peasants who immigrated to the region.<sup>46</sup>

In the theoretical framework of this article, the fact that the immigration of the Finnish peasants was tolerated but not encouraged by the Crown is of great importance. The *Ingermanländska kapitulationen* was already altered in the late 1620s to allow the settlement of farmers other than those of Dutch and German origin because it was difficult to attract peasants from these areas.<sup>47</sup> The original unwillingness of the Crown to bring in peasants from 'Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Russia or Ingria' underscores the expectations of *expertise* that the Swedish Crown had regarding the peasants and landlords that would come from more central and agriculture-intensive areas of Europe. To put it in Ash's terms, for the Crown, the Swedish, Finnish, Estonian, Russian and Ingrian peasants were ordinary practitioners of trade, in this case, agriculture, whereas the Dutch and German farmers were, at least in the minds and plans of the Swedish administrators, experts who would import skills that could not be gained otherwise. They possessed specific practical and productive knowledge of efficient agricultural practices that the Finnish peasants

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<sup>46</sup> Kepsu, *Den besvärliga provinsen*, pp. 51–52.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 108–09.

lacked. Having worked the soils of more agriculture-intensive areas in Europe, they had theoretical experience-based knowledge in the sense that it could, hypothetically, be applied in a new context: Ingria. Finally, the Crown of Sweden codified and legitimised their expertise in, for example, the *Ingermanländska kapitulationen* giving preference to Dutch and German agricultural knowledge. In this sense, while only ordinary practitioners in their original home areas, their know-how was ‘upgraded’ to expertise and codified as such in the Swedish-Ingrian context.

Ultimately, to reconnect with Ash’s five-stage model for early modern expertise, the German and Dutch landowners and peasants that the Crown of Sweden wanted but largely failed to attract to Ingria in the 1620s and 1630s are to be considered as experts for five reasons, outlined as follows. (1) They possessed specific practical and productive knowledge in a particular field – agriculture. As the *Ingermanländska kapitulationen* clearly postulates, Central European landowners and peasants were seen as experts of agriculture, whereas Finnish, Swedish, Ingrian, Russian or Estonian peasants were not. (2) The know-how of these Central European landowners and peasants was clearly experience-based, and the Crown sought these individuals because they had experience of agricultural production that was different from the conventional Nordic system. (3) This experience also included abstraction from practice to theory because the expertise of the Dutch and Germans was considered to be theoretical enough to be transferrable from Central Europe to Ingria. (4) The aloof and *laissez-faire* attitude of the Crown towards the Finnish peasants migrating to Ingria also showed that not just any ordinary practitioner of a specific trade was considered an expert. While the Dutch and Germans were considered agricultural experts, the Swedes, Finns, Ingridians, Estonians and Russians were not. (5) Finally, the expertise of the foreign landowners and peasants was also legitimised by the social and political context, in this case, the emerging early modern empire of Sweden itself.

## CONCLUSIONS

Our cases of the Scottish officers and the Dutch and German settlers in Ingria are two examples of the Swedish Crown’s needs and expertise expectations. The cases present two different groups in a rather a similar

context. This context consists of Swedish attempts to both maintain and expand the empire by finding and harvesting foreign know-how. By applying Eric H. Ash's model of early modern expertise to these groups, it is possible to shed light not only on the kind of expertise that the Swedish Crown was looking to bring into its service but also on how the Crown could evaluate the skills of foreign experts in order to deem them capable of handling the operations that the Crown needed.

In both cases, prior identification of the supposed expertise of these foreign groups preceded the Crown's attempts to utilise it. In the case of Scottish officers, the Scots had a Europe-wide reputation of being good professional soldiers. In the case of the Dutch and German landowners, the Swedish Crown had already deemed them experts in agricultural matters before contacting them.

The Swedish Crown attempted to establish networks between the Swedish government, foreign experts and their home countries. These networks served an important double purpose. First of all, they were vital tools by which the capabilities and the *expertise* of the individuals could be evaluated. Secondly, they were a way to both bring experts into the service of the Swedish Crown and, hopefully, to bind them to the empire. Consequently, the network provided the Swedish Crown with a way of estimating the capabilities of the experts and their trustworthiness before committing to contract them. By communicating, via diplomacy, with foreign aristocrats or governments who recommended experts for the Swedish service, the Swedish Crown was able to build lasting relationships with these experts. More importantly, via the networks, the Crown was also able to establish even deeper relationships with those individuals who had already proven their expertise through their own service records while in Swedish service. By binding trustworthy foreign experts to the empire via land grants, titles and offices, the Swedish Crown attempted to create a cluster of foreign experts it could trust and who could, via their own networks, bring more trustworthy individuals into the Swedish service.

In the case of the Dutch and German landowners and peasants, the Swedish Crown could not establish a good network that it could use to bring and bind agricultural experts to the empire continuously over multiple decades. Instead, the case represents an experimental attempt

to deploy foreign expertise in a specific place and point of time. The case of the Scottish officers is the opposite: the continuous wars that Sweden was locked in during the second half of the sixteenth century created a constant need for military expertise. The Swedish Crown was able to establish a network of Scottish military enterprisers that produced a continuous line of Scottish officers in the Swedish service, and the Crown was able to use them as recruiters, as professional soldiers and as promoters of new Scottish military experts in the Swedish service.

In the context of empire and new diplomatic history, as elucidated in the introduction to this issue, all kinds of state and non-state authors can be seen as working within the larger field of diplomacy. The cases of recruiting Scottish captains and Dutch and German landlords and peasants showcase the kinds of expectations that the Swedish Crown had regarding foreign experts. The Crown wanted these experts to defend its functions, expand its borders and make more of existing resources, whether military troops or agricultural lands. Scottish officers and Dutch and German agricultural experts participated in constructing the empire because they had specific projected roles to play in developing and maintaining the Swedish might in the Baltic region. These experts reinforced existing international networks and created new ones for the benefit of the Swedish Empire. Scottish officers and Central European landowners possessed something that the Crown considered impossible to harness and recruit within the kingdom itself: the specific expertise needed to maintain and expand an emerging empire.

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